Open Skies Treaty

The United States announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies on May 22, 2020; this withdrawal took effect on November 22, 2020. Russia has also announced its plans to withdraw, noting that it would begin the domestic procedures for withdrawal on January 15, 2021, and would then send the official notification to the other treaty parties.

Key Provisions:

  • Open Skies participants make all their territory accessible to over flights by unarmed fixed-wing observation aircraft. They can restrict flights for safety concerns, but cannot impede or prohibit flights over areas, including military installations that would otherwise be off-limits. In most cases, the nation conducting the observation flight provides the aircraft and sensors; officials from the host nation participate in the flight.
  • The nation conducting an observation flight must provide 72 hours’ notice before arriving in the host country. This provides the host with time to suspend sensitive military exercises or activities. The observation team presents a mission plan, specifying details including the route and altitude for the flight.
  • The host nation can propose changes to the mission plan, due to weather or flight safety considerations, but it cannot deny access to any area of its territory.
  • Open Skies aircraft can be equipped with four types of sensors: optical panoramic and framing cameras (for still photography) with a ground resolution of 30 centimeters (around one foot); video cameras with a ground resolution of 30 centimeters; infrared line-scanning devices with a ground resolution of 50 centimeters (around 20 inches); and sideways-looking synthetic aperture radars (SARs) with a ground resolution of 3 meters (around 8 feet).
  • This equipment can collect basic information on military forces and activities, but would not provide detailed technical intelligence. It also allows monitoring of military and civilian infrastructure, such as industrial plants, airports, roads, and railway lines, but would not allow recognition of sensitive details about items such as electronic equipment.
  • The participants can upgrade cameras and sensors as technology advances, as long as the capabilities remain within treaty parameters. The party using the new technology must demonstrate that technology to the others participants and receive consensus approval before they can transition to new cameras.
  • Russia has recently equipped its aircraft with electro-optical cameras, replacing film with digital cameras. In 2018, the United States blocked approval of Russia’s use of new cameras, delaying flights planned for that year; it reversed this decision in late 2018, and flights resumed in 2019

Russian Compliance

  • According to the U.S. State Department, Russia restricted access for Open Skies flights over Kaliningrad, over Moscow, and along the border between Russia and the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
  • Russia reportedly also failed to provide priority flight clearance for Open Skies flights on a few occasions. The United States raised these issues in the Open Skies Consultative Commission; some have been resolved.
  • Nevertheless, the United States responded to limitations imposed by Russia by limiting the length of flights over Hawaii and removing access to two U.S. Air Force bases used during Russian missions over the United States.

Benefits and Risks

  • When the United States first signed Open Skies, most analysts agreed that the treaty would provide little information not already available from observation satellites. But supporters argued that the treaty could still benefit the United States and its allies.
  • For example, most treaty participants do not have observation satellites, so, as former Secretary of State George Schultz noted, “Open Skies is their only means of alleviating security concerns through timely overhead imagery.
  • ” This reduces the risk of misunderstandings or crises that could involve the United States and contributes to “a more stable and secure European continent.”
  • In 1992, analysts asserted the treaty would create few risks for the United States because Russia could collect more detailed information with observation satellites.
  • Nevertheless, some U.S. military and intelligence officials have since cautioned that better optical technology might allow Russia to overcome weaknesses in its satellite surveillance capabilities.

Conclusions:

  • Russia would operate commercially available cameras, with resolutions that are both within the bounds established by the treaty and also less precise than those offered by commercial satellites.